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 Towards the Next Phase of the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice:  
The European Commission’s Proposals 
for the Stockholm Programme 
Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera 
 
he European Union needs a new five-year 
strategy for the development of the next phase 
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ). The existing plan, designed in The Hague 
Programme of 2004,
1 expires at the end of this year. 
The Justice and Home Affairs research unit of CEPS 
has already set out, in several contributions, the big 
issues and provided policy recommendations for the 
next five-year plan – The Stockholm Programme – 
which will be adopted under the Swedish Presidency 
in December.
2 In June 2009, the European 
Commission published its perspective towards the 
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Stockholm process in its Communication: “An area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice serving the citizen: 
Wider freedom in a safer environment”.
3 In this Policy 
Brief, we take a closer look at the Commission’s 
Communication and highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approaches adopted for each of the 
different policy domains falling under the AFSJ 
rubric. The Communication assesses the AFSJ under 
three main headings: 1. successes, 2. ambivalent areas 
and 3. challenges. We will also follow these headings 
and comment accordingly. Our commentary on the 
three areas also provides answers to some of the 
thorny questions raised in the priorities for the 
Stockholm Programme. We spell these out in the 
conclusions and put forth a set of policy 
recommendations. 
1.  Successes in the AFSJ 
The Commission considers that there have been four 
main successes over the past five years of the AFSJ. 
The choice of these successes reflects the 
Commission’s key concerns for the development of 
‘the area’, so we will consider each in turn. 
The first success the Commission highlights is the 
lifting of Schengen border controls between the 
EU13 (the pre-2004 member states minus Ireland and 
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the UK) and the EU9 (the states that joined in 2004 
minus Cyprus). This event took place between 
December 2007 and May 2008, and is indeed one of 
the high points of policy-making and delivery in the 
AFSJ. With a few notable exceptions – with Ireland 
and the UK remaining in splendid and voluntary 
isolation, continuing to apply border controls on 
everyone entering their territory, while Bulgaria and 
Romania are waiting to join the border-free area and 
Cyprus is first sorting out its own border before it can 
join – the rest of the EU is a border control-free zone. 
While there have been teething troubles with the 
lifting of border controls, which we have criticised,
4 
the achievement of eliminating border guards from the 
inter-member state borders is nevertheless impressive. 
EU citizens are very positive about their freedom to 
travel without administrative obstacles. While they 
continue to complain about identity checks at airports, 
the reduction of obstacles to free movement is 
generally hailed as a great improvement and a notable 
success of the internal market, thanks to the AFSJ.  
There was much doubt about whether the EU9 were 
ready for the lifting of border controls. Some feared 
an explosion of cross-border criminality, others a rush 
of irregular migrants. None of this seems to have 
materialised. Bearing in mind the substantial 
difficulties associated with the preparation of 
comparative statistics on crime across the EU has 
presented, nonetheless EUROSTAT has succeeded, 
with caveats, to produce statistics on some crimes 
across 14 member states for the period 1995-2006. 
These statistics indicate a general downwards trend 
since 1995 when border controls were first abolished 
in many types of crime (motor vehicle theft being the 
most substantial with a 5.3% drop between 1995 and 
2006), although this trend is less clear in other 
crimes.
5 EUROSTAT statistics indicate that in 2007, 
crimes in respect of which it was able to collect 
information continued to fall in the EU, 
notwithstanding the abolition of border controls on 
persons. 
Irregular migration remains an uncertain category. 
The Commission estimates that there are 8 million 
undocumented persons in the EU, although whether 
such a figure is accurate remains unclear.
6 The results 
of one research project, for example, funded by the 
European Commission itself – CLANDESTINO
7 – 
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6 Commission Communication (2009) 262, p. 4. 
7 CLANDESTINO (Undocumented Migration: Counting the 
Uncountable Data and Trends across Europe) is a research project 
which has offered a rather different picture on 
estimations of irregular immigrants in the EU. In 
particular, it appears from the results coming out of a 
database set up by this project that the range is more 
likely to be between 2.8 and 6 million (both figures 
were calculated for 2005).
8 As an aside, this is still a 
small (yet illustrative) example of the ‘policy gap’
9 
that often exists between research projects on irregular 
immigration funded by the EU institutions and the 
European Commission (in this case by DG Research) 
and the policies proposed and developed by DG 
Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JFS) of the 
Commission. This ‘gap’ undermines the goal of 
evidence-based and coherent policy-making at EU 
level. 
In any event, there does not appear to have been a 
substantial increase of irregular immigration in the EU 
since 2007-08, as had been feared. In fact, according 
to the Council’s Centre for Information, Discussion 
and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and 
Immigration (CIREFI), which monitors what they 
term ‘illegal immigration’,
10 according to (as yet 
unpublished) information from the member states for 
2006, the largest national group of persons designated 
as ‘illegal immigrants’ in the EU25 were Romanian 
nationals. This group far exceeded all others.
11 As 
Romanians became citizens of the Union on 1 January 
2007, they ceased to be irregular immigrants in the 
EU26 except in the most exceptional circumstances. 
Thus for completely different reasons, it is probable 
that the statistics will show that the number of persons 
irregularly entering and present in the EU27 will have 
diminished in 2007, notwithstanding the abolition of 
border controls.  
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Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing 
of Frontiers and Immigration (Cirefi) OJ C 274, 19.09.1996. 
11 Refer to D Bigo, Map of Undocumented Foreigners in the EU, 
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the EU, CIREFI Summary Report January-June 2009, 11502/09, 1 
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The Commission counts FRONTEX, its external 
border agency, among its successes, pointing to the 
increased coherence of external border management. 
The FRONTEX press releases reveal a somewhat 
more uncertain picture. For instance, the FRONTEX 
operation ZARATHUSTRA, carried out between 26 
March 2008 and 14 April 2008, had a budget of 
€236,390. Its focus was on the detection of irregular 
migrants from Iraq and Afghanistan at the European 
external borders. According to the Commission’s 
report, “60 illegal migration related incidents were 
detected, 16 refusals and 15 forged documents were 
identified”.
12 By participating in FRONTEX actions 
such as this one, Member States might endanger their 
human rights responsibilities under international 
treaties and EU law to provide protection to asylum-
seekers and refugees. We fail to see how the 
Commission could hold up FRONTEX operations as a 
success when measured against the negative 
implications of these border control practices over the 
obligation to provide protection to refugees. 
The second success the Commission claims is the 
foundation of a common framework for 
immigration, integration and stronger action 
against ‘illegal immigration’  and human 
trafficking.  Partnerships with non-EU countries 
are equally highlighted as a success. We would agree 
that the two Council Directives – long-term resident 
third country nationals and family reunification
13 – are 
steps in the right direction. Neither is perfect; both 
include ambiguous integration clauses and so far the 
implementation at member state level leaves much to 
be desired.
14 The Commission itself has recognised 
that the minimum standard of family reunification 
contained in the Directive (2003/86) is insufficient to 
attract highly qualified migrants to the EU – separate 
and more flexible rules have been adopted for them.
15 
Even with the Blue Card Directive, which allows 
member states to continue to apply their national work 
permit schemes and never use the system at all, it is 
stretching the point to say that the foundations of a 
common EU immigration system are now in place. 
There is still little coherence in how non-EU nationals 
first come to the EU for extended stays. While 
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http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati
/art28.html visited 29 March 2009. 
13 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003. Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 
16/44, 23.1.2004. 
14 European Commission, Report on the Application of the 
Directive 2003/86 on the Right to Family Reunification, 
COM(2008) 610, Brussels, 8.10.2008. 
15 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment, OJ L155/17, 18.6.2009, Art. 15. 
common rules on students and researchers have been 
adopted,
16 the rest remains to be negotiated. 
The suggestion included in the Communication that 
we have arrived at a common agenda for facilitating 
the integration of foreigners into European 
societies needs also to be considered with some care 
when qualifying it as a ‘success’. It is true that in the 
last seven years the European Commission has 
managed to move policy coordination very 
dynamically into a domain in which subsidiarity and 
member states’ national competences remain the 
driving factors. However, what have been the costs of 
having ‘more Europe’ in this field? 
First, the EU framework on integration has lately 
constituted a vehicle for legitimising and promoting at 
European level certain member states’ policies and 
immigration national laws, using integration as a tool 
for practising a restrictive immigration policy (i.e. 
limiting the number of legal entries and residence 
permits of immigrants, and their access to 
fundamental rights such as the right to a family life).
17 
The use of mandatory integration programmes and 
integration abroad tests were not part of more 
traditional concepts of integration which formed part 
of EU’s policy discourse since the 1970s,
18 and which 
considered integration as a process for equalization of 
rights and freedoms, security of residence, non-
discrimination and family reunion. In addition to the 
conflicts that current nationalist approaches to 
integration pose to the fair and equal treatment 
paradigm that should continue guiding the EU’s 
common immigration policy, the compatibility of 
these new policies with the rule of law and 
fundamental rights remains an issue of concern.
19 
Second, some of the policy tools upon which the EU 
framework on integration will be increasingly based 
(e.g. benchmarking) are too subjective in nature and 
lack methodological rigour – weaknesses that will 
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18 For an in depth study see S. Carrera, In Search of the Perfect 
Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, Immigration and 
Nationality in the EU, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.  
19 For a detailed analysis refer to E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. 
Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship 
and Integration in the EU, Ashgate: Hampshire, forthcoming. 4 | Guild & Carrera 
prevent policy coherence and independent (ideology-
free) output.
20  
Third, the exchange of national experiences and 
practices on integration has so far taken place within 
the scope of the network of National Contact Points 
(NCPs) on integration. This ‘exchange’ could more 
usefully include a pluralistic dialogue with civil 
society and local and regional authorities and 
networks of practitioners, and a proper democratic 
accountability and scrutiny of EU policy. The 
European Integration Forum
21 offers interesting 
perspectives on the input from civil society, yet its 
success will very much depend on the ways in which 
it ensures that its ‘voice’, inputs and opinions have an 
impact on the European Commission and member 
states’ policy priorities and agendas.  
There is also a lack of any sustainable and structured 
involvement and partnership between local and 
regional bodies/networks and the Committee of the 
Regions in the EU framework on integration, including 
the work by DG JFS of the Commission. The local and 
regional dimensions could play a decisive role in 
channelling knowledge and practical experience to the 
national and EU arenas as well as in the evaluation of 
the adequate, timely and consistent 
transposition/implementation of common EU policies 
and funding on immigration and integration.
22 
Stronger action against ‘illegal immigration’, 
another success claimed by the Commission, is also 
somewhat ambiguous. First, the European 
Commission and Council’s insistence on using the 
term ‘illegal’ to refer to people is objectionable and 
discouraged in international fora. People are not 
illegal; their presence on a territory may not be 
authorised or their status as an immigrant may lack 
proper documentation, but that does not put them in a 
category where their very existence constitutes 
illegality.
23 The EU should refrain from using this 
term. As the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly stated in Recommendation 1509(2006): 
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nationals, Opinion, SOC/281, Brussels, 9 July 2008. 
22 For an in-depth analysis, see S. Carrera, The Role and Potential 
for Local and Regional Authorities in the EU Framework on the 
Integration of Immigrants, study commissioned by the 
Commission for Constitutional Affairs, European Governance and 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice of the Committee of the 
Regions, Brussels, 2009.  
23 E. Guild, “Who is an Irregular Immigrant”, in B. Bogusz, R. 
Cholewinski, A. Cygan and E. Szyszczak (eds), Irregular 
Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and 
International Perspectives, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 3-
28. 
“the Assembly prefers to use the term ‘irregular 
migrant’ to other terms such as ‘illegal migrant’ or 
‘migrant without papers’; (para 159) This term is 
more neutral and does not carry, for example, the 
stigma of the term ‘illegal’. It is also the term 
increasingly favoured by international organisations 
working on migration issues.” This has been 
confirmed by the European Parliament Resolution of 
14 January 2009 on the situation of fundamental rights 
in the European Union 2004-2008,
24 in which it called 
upon EU institutions and member states to stop using 
the term ‘illegal immigrants’, and instead to refer to 
‘irregular/undocumented workers/migrants’. 
Certainly, in the past five years we have seen an 
increasing number of EU measures aimed at 
prosecuting employers,
25 transport companies and 
others as criminals for their association with third 
country nationals in the EU. But, as mentioned above, 
the most effective action, numerically speaking, has 
been transforming so-called ‘illegals’ into citizens of 
the Union – as with the accession of Romania to the 
EU. The second national category of ‘illegal’ 
immigrants in the EU, according to CIREFI on the 
basis of national government information, is 
Albania.
26 If current plans go as foreseen, and ‘all the 
conditions are met’, they will cease to be visa 
nationals by mid-2010.
27  
In the context of the so-called ‘Global Approach to 
Migration’ of the EU, partnerships with third 
countries remain somewhat uncharted territory. 
While there are an increasing number of agreements 
with third countries around migration issues, such as 
readmission agreements and visa facilitation 
agreements, there is no indication that there are any 
substantial consequences resulting from these 
agreements. Further, the mobility partnerships 
concluded between the EU, a selection of interested 
EU member states and third countries under the 
coordination of the Commission raise a whole range 
                                                      
24 European Parliament resolution of 14 January 2009 on the 
situation of fundamental rights in the European Union 2004-2008, 
P6_TA-PROV(2009)0019. 
25 S. Carrera & E. Guild, An EU Framework on Sanctions against 
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Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2007.  
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27 European Commission, Press Release, Commission proposes 
visa free travel for Western Balkans, IP/09/1138, Brussels, 15 July 
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countries put their full will into delivering now. If this progress 
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their neighbours. If all the conditions are fulfilled, the 
Commission could envisage making a new proposal, which would 
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of open questions.
28 Mobility partnerships constitute 
non-legally binding agreements (Joint Declarations) 
covering issues of irregular immigration (return and 
readmission, as well as promoting cooperation on 
border controls), legal channels of human mobility 
and development cooperation. So far two have been 
concluded with Moldova and Cape Verde,
29 and 
countries like Mauritius and India have also expressed 
an interest.  
Apart from issues of legal uncertainty related to their 
nature and effects, as well as the lack of democratic 
accountability when taking into account the exclusion 
of the European Parliament before and during their 
negotiations, these tools might constitute a far-
reaching challenge to the policy coherency of the 
common EU immigration policy. When looking at the 
body of the partnerships, it is in our view clear that the 
Commission will encounter multifarious difficulties at 
times of coordinating the diversified and complex 
matrix of member states’ interests, priorities and 
(bilateral and multilateral) projects involved. They 
also present serious deficits when trying to put into 
practice a temporary labour migration regime around 
the concept of ‘circular migration’ (i.e. the temporary 
and recurrent management of the movement of people 
back and forth – between the EU and their country of 
origin). Indeed, mobility partnerships advocate a 
framing of migration combining the old (yet 
unsuccessful) public authority ambition to control 
human movements in a way that prevents and 
disregards social settlement/inclusion, access to rights 
and permanent security of residence.
30 This policy 
framing is also driven by a utilitarian and selective 
logic of human movements, serving mainly the 
economic interests and labour market demands of 
participating states. They therefore leave aside (and 
marginalise) the liberty, security (and independence) 
of the individual subject to these new EU policy 
processes, in particular as they relate to human rights, 
and fail to acknowledge the ‘unexpected sociology’ 
surrounding any act of human mobility beyond 
narrow legalities and policies pretending to keep it 
‘temporary’ in nature and scope.  
The third success the Commission points to are the 
foundations of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS)  and a common visa policy. Why 
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29 Council of the EU, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnerships 
between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, 
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30 R. Bauböck, Ties Across Borders: The Growing Salience of 
Transnationalism and Diaspora Politics, IMISCOE Policy Brief 
No. 13, October 2008 (www.imiscoe.org).  
these two are lumped together is uncertain. One hopes 
that it is not an indication that a common visa system 
is seen as a tool that keeps refugees out of the EU. 
The leading countries of origin of refugees worldwide 
are, in order of total numbers: Afghanistan, Iraq 
(together these two account for almost half of the 
world’s refugees), Colombia, Sudan and Somalia. All 
of these countries are on the EU visa black list; 
whether a refugee or not, a national of any of these 
countries cannot come to the EU without a visa (and 
there are no rules on issuing visas to seek asylum). 
Carrier sanctions dissuade airlines and ships from 
carrying persons without visas if they need them. The 
CEAS has many minimum standard instruments 
covering most of the asylum field. What it lacks is 
coherence at the point of implementation. Outcomes 
still vary far too much in the EU for asylum-seekers 
whose cases are similar. For instance, in respect of 
Afghan nationals, in 2007 Italy gave protection to 
98% of the Afghans who sought it there,
31 the UK 
gave protection to 42%
32 and Greece did not give 
protection to a single Afghan.
33  
The fourth success the Commission stresses is the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW).
34 The 
Commission rightly stresses that extradition delays 
have been reduced dramatically from one year to 
between 11 days and six weeks. The system works 
very well where the person sought agrees to return to 
the state that wants him or her. It works much less 
satisfactorily when the individual challenges 
extradition. There are still substantial problems for the 
EAW – first an increasing number of member states 
complain about the resources that their police forces 
are required to invest in rounding up nationals of other 
member states over very minor criminal charges. A 
second problem is the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) condemnation of prison conditions in 
one member state as failing Article 3 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) test on 
inhuman and degrading treatment in the case of 
Slawomir Musial v Poland.
35 Now, it is difficult to see 
how any member state could fulfil an EAW without 
risking a breach of its own ECHR obligation not to 
send persons to a place where there is a substantial 
risk they will suffer torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.
36 
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The final two successes the Commission notes are 
beyond our scope here – combating crime including 
cyber-crime and progress in civil and commercial 
law. We will leave these two successes to others to 
comment upon.  
In sum, there have been real successes in the past five 
years of AFSJ. We are proud of the positive 
developments which have helped everyone in the 
Union to achieve their potential. But it does not help 
anyone’s credibility to overlook the problems that 
persist. 
2. Ambivalent  areas 
The Commission accepts that activity in the AFSJ has 
been less than fully effective in two specific areas: 
criminal law and civil and commercial cases. We will 
comment on the first only. We certainly share the 
Commission’s assessment that there are problems 
with the limitations of the European Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction in criminal law cases. This needs to be 
resolved. The fact that the member states have not 
resolved this individually by making declarations, as 
foreseen under the Amsterdam Treaty, which permit 
their national courts to make references to the ECJ in 
such cases is a real shame. The member states could 
have shown their commitment to the rule of law by 
doing so but instead too many of them either failed to 
make a declaration at all or limited their courts of final 
instance to reference-making powers. The problem 
will be resolved if the Lisbon Treaty comes into force 
but a little more leadership from the member states 
would have been most welcome, particularly as they 
claim to be fervent supporters of the principle of rule 
of law.  
Further, the Commission notes that the member 
states’ delay in transposing criminal law measures 
has given them a ‘virtual character’ in the sense that it 
exists on paper but has not been transposed or put into 
practice in many member states. We would agree, 
once again the failure of the member states to live up 
to their obligations is frustrating and obstructive. If 
member states do not want legislation then they 
should ensure that it is not passed. If, on the other 
hand, they are in favour of it, they should transpose it 
within the time limits set out. There is no honourable 
third way. However, we would suggest that the 
problem may run deeper than just laziness or 
obstructiveness in some government departments in 
the member states. Apart from the EAW, it remains 
unclear as to whether there is really an appetite for 
more criminal justice measures at the EU level. The 
European Evidence Warrant has been adopted and is 
available for use but it seems to be a rather unpopular 
measure.
37 Member states’ criminal justice authorities 
seem to be happier to use the more traditional mutual 
assistance mechanisms developed by the Council of 
Europe. While they have a brand new instrument that 
is supposed to be better for criminal justice purposes, 
the users seem to be happy with the older, tried and 
trusted tools. There is a problem here, however. Either 
the new tools are indeed better, in which case their 
virtues need to be sold to the criminal justice 
community, or there is not enough benefit in the new 
tools to justify their existence.  
3.  The challenges ahead 
The Commission sets out eight issues that it considers 
to be challenges for the future. These are: obstacles to 
residence in other EU member states; civil justice 
issues; cyber-crime; terrorism; border controls; 
migration and an ageing population; ‘illegal 
migration’ and asylum. We will comment on six of 
these (leaving aside civil justice and cyber-crime for 
other commentators). 
The Commission is concerned about obstacles that 
EU nationals encounter when moving to another 
member state. It is right to be concerned about this 
and we agree that ensuring that EU nationals can 
enjoy the rights the Treaties promise them should be 
the top priority of the next five years of AFSJ. As the 
Commission’s study of the implementation of the 
right of free movement of citizens of the Union 
shows, no one member state has correctly 
implemented the EU rules and not one of the rules has 
been correctly implemented by all the member 
states.
38 Considering that free movement of workers 
had to be achieved by 1968 this is a fairly 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. Of course we recognise 
that enlargement creates teething troubles in the free 
movement of EU citizens and their family members 
(especially if the latter are third country nationals). 
Officials have trouble adjusting to the idea that 
someone whom they considered an ‘illegal immigrant’ 
yesterday is today a citizen of the Union – entitled to 
entry, residence, economic activities, family 
reunification with third country national family 
members and social benefits, particularly those related 
to economic insertion.
39 Nonetheless, this is the 
                                                      
37 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 
2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of 
obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in 
criminal matters, OJ L350/72, 30.12.2008. 
38 Commission Report on the application of Directive 2004/38 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the member states, 
COM(2008) 840 final, Brussels, 10 December 2008. S. Carrera 
and A. Faure-Atger, Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the 
context of Enlargement: A Proliferation of Different Forms of 
Citizenship?, CEPS Special Report, Brussels, April 2009. 
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commitment the EU makes on accession and the equal 
treatment of citizens of the Union is the promise we 
make to ourselves, which helps to make the EU the 
sought-after place it is for its citizens. Out of an EU of 
almost 500 million citizens, a mere 8 million of them 
exercise their right to move and reside elsewhere in 
the EU than their home state. Surely it cannot be that 
difficult to treat them equally and in accordance with 
the law? Further, as stipulated in the Commission 
Communication on guidance for better transposition 
and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the 
member states, COM(2009) 313, the freedom of 
movement of persons is one of the foundations of the 
EU, and derogations from that principle must be 
interpreted strictly.
40  
What emerges clearly from this is that the 
presumption that the mechanisms of the EU legal 
system to ensure a correct transposition of EU law 
work satisfactorily in practice is no longer sustainable 
and calls for innovative strategies. Indeed closer 
attention needs to be given to address the mismatch 
between European norms and national implementation 
and on improving the use of (ex post) evaluation 
systems on rule of law standards and good 
administration conditions of member states’ national 
regimes at play in the AFSJ.
41 
As regards terrorism, the Commission notes that this 
remains a threat to the Union, citing the existence of 
600 terrorist attacks in 2007. However, it fails to point 
out that in 2007, according to TEL-SAT, Europol’s 
report on terrorism in the EU, the largest number of 
attacks took place in Spain – 279 of which only seven 
were not motivated by separatist sentiment – followed 
by France – 253 where all but 14 were separatist 
attacks. The remaining 14 in France and 7 in Spain 
were not specified. Germany comes next on the list 
with 20 attacks, of which 15 were separatist, 4 left 
wing and one ‘Islamist’. The UK also gave notice of 
two ‘Islamist’ attacks and Denmark had one. The only 
notified right wing attack took place in Portugal in 
2007, which also had the only single issue attack. 
Greece had only 2 attacks in 2007, both left wing. In 
total, in 2007, there were four ‘Islamist’ attacks (no 
casualties), 532 separatist attacks resulting in two 
                                                      
40 Commission Communication, on guidance for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the member states, COM(2009) 
313, 2 July 2009, Brussels. 
41 S. Alegre et al., Safeguarding the Rule of Law in an Enlarged 
EU: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania, CEPS Special Report, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 24 April 2009. 
Refer also to J. De Clerck-Sachsse (ed.), Time for Action: 
Immediate Priorities for the Next European Commission, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 193, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, July 2009. 
casualties, 21 left wing attacks one each of right wing 
and single issue attacks and 24 unspecified attacks.
42 
This means, in short, that most of what is called 
‘terrorism’ in the EU is highly local and nationally 
oriented. If one takes this aspect into account, one 
could argue that terrorism is not a primary issue for 
the EU, but rather one for the member states. Thus, 
this category of crime in the EU might be better 
incorporated into the general activities of the EU on 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  
Border controls are identified by the Commission as 
an issue for the future. This is certainly true as the 
continuing EU’s enlargement programme makes it 
very uncertain where the external borders of the EU 
may be in two, five or ten years’ time. There is no 
point investing substantial resources in ‘hard’ border 
controls in places where within a short period of time 
it is likely that there will be no border controls at all. 
This is not a good way to spend money. At the 
moment, the temptation inside the Commission is to 
resolve the question of ‘border controls’ via a 
technological fix.
43 Ideas such as ‘smart borders’ and 
an ‘EU entry-exit system’ with massive technological 
spending implications has caught on in some parts of 
the Commission. The wisdom of such an approach is 
unclear. Already the USA is having trouble with its 
smart border systems, which include chips in 
passports and RFID (radio frequency identification) – 
according to news reports not only is the technology a 
forgers’ dream come true, the machines that are 
supposed to simplify life by recognising the chips and 
RFID fail to do so at an unacceptably high rate.
44 The 
real problem, however, is the perception of border 
crossing as an inherently dangerous activity. It is not. 
Millions of people cross borders every day. It is only 
in the most exceptional cases that there is something 
amiss in their objectives or activities. The border is 
not a place of danger but a place through which 
normal economic and social activity takes place. Old-
fashioned policing provides a better approach to crime 
control and political violence than seeking to displace 
worries to border controls and then finding a 
technological magic fix. The only winners in this 
move are the companies that develop the technologies 
and their successes are financial at the expense of EU 
tax-payers. 
The Commission considers that migration and an 
ageing population are among the challenges for the 
next five years of the AFSJ. It notes that migratory 
                                                      
42 DG H 2A, Council Document Number 8065/07 entitled TE-
SAT 2008 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008, The 
Hague 2008.  
43 E. Guild, S. Carrera and F. Geyer, The Commission’s new 
border package: Does it take us one step closer to a ‘cyber-
fortress’ Europe?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 154, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2008. 
44 15 July 2009, International Herald Tribune, p. 21. 8 | Guild & Carrera 
pressure is likely to rise on account of population 
growth (but not in Europe, where we are struggling to 
stay constant), poverty in countries of origin and the 
ageing population in the EU. The use of the pressure 
analogy when discussing migration is not very 
informative or helpful. If we take the EU for instance, 
according to Eurostat in December 2008, 
unemployment stood at 2.7% in the Netherlands and 
14.4% in Spain. Yet there is very little movement 
between the two. Statutory minimum wages are under 
€300 per month in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania; between 
€301 and €999 per month in the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain and more 
than €1,000 per month in the rest (at least the rest of 
those states that have a minimum wage). The highest 
minimum wage is in Luxembourg at €1,570 per 
month. Yet movement of EU nationals from Bulgaria 
and Estonia to Luxembourg is minimal. The average 
minimum salary in Denmark is the equivalent of 
€1,850 per month, €1,277 in Germany and €1,258 in 
France. But the average salary in Portugal is €470 per 
month, €246 in Poland and €92 in Bulgaria (for some 
of these countries there is a narrow range).
45 Pressure 
and relative poverty does not explain migration 
patterns any more satisfactorily than unemployment 
rates. There is no reason to think that non-EU 
nationals behave any differently from EU nationals. 
Perhaps the challenge of migration and an ageing 
population is more about how to convince people 
who, as they grow older, tend to be more conservative 
and fearful of accepting that migration, both in the 
form of immigration and emigration, is a good and 
necessary part of any healthy democracy.  
Tackling ‘illegal’ immigration  is also a challenge 
seen by the Commission. As we have mentioned 
above, ceasing to use the terminology of ‘illegal’ 
migration would be an excellent starting place in this 
regard. However, the Commission considers that 
addressing the factors that attract clandestine 
immigration is the way forward. A vibrant economy is 
a most attractive factor in the migration choices of 
individuals. Just as some EU citizens may be 
considering migrating to parts of the world with more 
job opportunities than the EU, so nationals of other 
countries are attracted to the EU when its economy is 
strong and producing job opportunities. Of course we 
are all in favour of better economic growth in the EU. 
No one in their right mind would suggest that 
dampening the labour market would be a good idea as 
it would make the EU less attractive to irregular 
migrants. So the question needs to be considered and 
addressed in other ways. In the term ‘illegal’ itself we 
can perhaps find an answer. What is needed is to 
                                                      
45 European Union Minimum Monthly Salaries 2008 
(http://eeuropeanrussianaffairs.suite101.com/article.cfm/european
_union_minimum_monthly_salaries_2008).  
change laws so that people do not fall into 
undocumented statuses. If we analyse the legal 
measures that lead to people being categorised as 
‘illegal’ or undocumented we may find a more helpful 
approach.  
For example, rules that prevent third country nationals 
and their prospective employers from applying for or 
receiving work authorisation while the third country 
national is in the EU state contributes to irregularity. 
Administrative delay in dealing with work 
authorisation, renewal of work and residence permits 
contributes dramatically to irregularity as individuals 
continue to live and work in the state after making 
their applications for extensions. The fact that their 
permission has expired because officials have taken so 
long to deal with the file results in irregularity. The 
rather infamous Italian notification to the Commission 
designating Italian Post Office registered delivery 
receipts as equivalent to Schengen visas for entry into 
the EU, was a result of exactly this problem of 
administrative delay.
46 Creating new criminal offences 
for employers, transporters, etc, is unhelpful in 
dealing with irregularity. First, there needs to be a 
common and accessible system whereby employers 
and individuals can obtain work authorisation. 
Finally, the Commission highlights the challenge of 
the CEAS. This is indeed a matter of great concern. 
The inequality of asylum outcomes across the EU is 
undermining the whole system itself. As mentioned 
above, it is just not sustainable that asylum-seekers of 
the same nationality receive almost 100% recognition 
of protection needs in some member states and 0% in 
others. However, there is another challenge to the 
CEAS, and this is how to access it at all. As many 
commentators have noted, an increasing array of no-
entry tools, such as visa requirements, carriers’ 
sanctions, hard border controls, agreements with third 
countries to prevent people from leaving, etc., make it 
increasingly difficult for refugees to get to Europe at 
all.
47 No amount of pious assurances that the EU 
respects the UN Convention relating to the status of 
refugees or the inclusion of reference to it in 
preambles to Directives can resolve this problem. 
                                                      
46 In 2007, the Italian authorities notified to the European 
Commission, as they are entitled to do under the Schengen 
Borders Code, a document, the production of which has the 
equivalence of a Schengen visa for the purposes of entry into the 
EU. This document was an Italian Post Office registered delivery 
receipt which documented that the holder had sent his or her 
residence permit to the Ministry of the Interior for renewal. Delays 
in dealing with renewals of residence documents which resulted 
from the consolidation of administrative powers in the Ministry 
caused the Ministry to make the notification in order that third 
country nationals resident in Italy and who needed to travel would 
be able to renter the EU after having done so. The notification was 
valid for a six-month period. 
47 See UNHCR comments on the European Asylum Policy 
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Indeed, such moves only make the EU look 
hypocritical rather than addressing the issue: ensuring 
that refugees who are fleeing to Europe are able to get 
protection in Europe.  
4. Conclusions and Recommendations: 
Towards a Europe of rights and justice? 
The Commission sets out four political priorities for 
the Stockholm Programme: 1. promoting citizens’ 
rights – a Europe of rights; 2. making life easier – a 
Europe of justice; 3. protecting citizens – a Europe 
that protects; and 4. promoting a more integrated 
society for the citizen – a Europe of solidarity. These 
are all user-friendly and catchy titles, but we need to 
think about what is behind them.  
First, the Communication argues that the main thrust 
of the new multi-annual Stockholm Programme 
should be “building a citizens’ Europe” and that all 
actions taken in the future should have ‘the citizen’ at 
their heart. It appears that the concept of citizen as 
used by the Communication refers exclusively to 
those individuals holding the nationality of one of the 
member states of the Union and therefore having the 
status of European citizenship. Such an AFSJ would 
be therefore too narrow and at odds with a Europe of 
diversity and of fundamental rights of all individuals 
who, independently of their nationality and 
administrative immigrant status, are holders of 
fundamental rights as recognised, among other 
instruments, by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU, the European Convention of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the 
jurisprudence of European Courts – European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg.
48 
The emphasis on ‘the citizen’ must not become a 
dividing line between citizens and third country 
nationals. The EU is committed to the fair and equal 
treatment of third country nationals and to the 
principles of non-discrimination and solidarity. The 
benefits of the EU in terms of rights must also be 
extended to those who live ‘here’ and are in the 
process of or have already acquired work and 
residence rights.  
Second, while the focus of the Communication on a 
Europe of rights is welcomed, the Commission does 
not propose a clear strategy as to the precise ways in 
which a common area of fundamental rights could be 
further developed and guaranteed both at the EU 
institutional level and by member states’ authorities 
while implementing and practising EU law. The text 
                                                      
48 Refer to the work of the SOC Section of the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Own-initiative 
Opinion on Fundamental Rights in European Immigration 
Legislation, SOC 335, retriavable from 
http://eesc.europa.eu/sections/soc/immigration_asylum.htm  
fails to go beyond formalistic and official allusions to 
the existing system of tools and institutional structures 
in charge of fundamental rights and freedoms without 
presenting a proactive roadmap for the near future. 
Even though the European system of fundamental 
human rights is indeed already well developed, the 
full respect and protection of these rights at the time 
of member states’ practical implementation of EU 
AFSJ law remains an issue of concern. Fundamental 
rights cannot be taken for granted in the EU and 
further strategies should be foreseen for the years to 
come beyond the symbolic power of a potential EU’s 
accession to the ECHR. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, as the 
Commission rightly states, must be put into practice. 
The rights that are contained in it need to become 
realities on the ground for everyone in the EU. The 
2009 political row over the imposition of visa 
requirements by Canada on Czech nationals arises 
from exactly this problem – Czech Roma are not 
enjoying the rights promised in the Charter and are 
seeking instead to enjoy rights under the Canadian 
Bill of Rights.
49 Everyone is entitled to protection of 
his or her personal data and privacy, not just citizens. 
The EU’s databases at the moment are heavily 
populated by third country nationals – the SIS, 
EURODAC and the proposed VIS.
50 Their privacy 
needs full protection already.  
Third,  making criminal justice ‘easier’ in the EU 
can mean many things. On the one hand, it could 
mean making life easier for police officers to sidestep 
around citizens’ civil liberties. If this is the meaning 
then there is a problem here. On the other hand, it 
could mean ensuring that a defendant anywhere in the 
EU enjoys the same high standard of defence rights. 
This would provide a good basis for further work on 
criminal justice. As the Communication states, an 
open-ended priority still remains regarding the need to 
ensure the rights of defence in criminal proceedings at 
EU level.
51 It is of serious concern that the EAW has 
been implemented and operating for several years 
now without being coupled with proper EU individual 
rights guarantees for suspected and accused persons 
under this supranational regime of cooperation. 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters will be a 
source of substantial conflict if the standards of 
criminal justice across the member states are not 
improved in general so that those with the least 
                                                      
49 Council of Europe, Report by Thomas Hammarberg, 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 
following his visit to Italy on 13-15 January 2009, published in 
Strasbourg, 16 April 2009. 
50 F. Geyer, Taking Stock: Databases and Systems of Information 
Exchange in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 9, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, May 2008. 
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effective and human rights-compliant practices are 
brought up to the standards of those that are more 
efficient and less prone to criticism at the ECtHR. The 
organising principle of the EU – supremacy of EU law 
over national law – may be placed at risk if there is 
more mutual recognition legislation without the 
improvement of rights standards. National police and 
courts will simply refuse to apply EU law as it will 
place them in an impossible position vis-à-vis their 
national constitutional obligations. Moreover, 
strengthening cooperation in police matters and law 
enforcement must mean ensuring the absence of 
corruption, the proper functioning of an independent 
judiciary across the EU and the delivery of a fair trial 
to all those who find themselves in the criminal justice 
system. 
Finally, an integrated society in the EU is also an 
ambiguous objective. The concept of ‘difference’ is 
highly valued in the EU – we have chosen, for 
example, to respect language differences across the 27 
countries and ensure that individuals anywhere in the 
Union can read and hear EU proclamations, laws and 
regulations in their own language. The Treaties 
themselves, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
state that diversity is a key strength of the EU.
52 We 
should remember this when we are thinking about 
third country nationals as well. The objective of 
solidarity is an excellent one, but it must encompass 
everyone who is living in the EU and embrace those 
who are seeking protection from persecution. 
In the light of the above, we propose the following 
four policy recommendations to DG JFS, European 
Commission, in prospect of the adoption of the 
Stockholm Programme and while performing the 
challenging task of implementing it as from the first 
half of 2010:
53 
1.  The knowledge and research findings coming 
out of projects funded by DG Research of the 
Commission
54 and other European institutions and 
agencies
55 should better inform and support policy 
initiatives put forward by DG JFS. Addressing the 
current ‘policy gap’ affecting EU policies on 
‘freedom, security and justice’ would not be only 
desirable to ensure policy coherency and evidence-
based policy-making by the Commission, but it 
                                                      
52 Refer to Article 151 EC Treaty and Article 22 of the Charter.  
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elaborated by the JHA Section of CEPS on the Stockholm 
Programme. Refer to footnote 2 above.  
54 See http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/policy_en.html  
55 As a way of illustration we can refer here to the studies on an 
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(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?l
anguage=EN) and the research by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
(http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/research_en.htm). 
would also show that an appropriate expenditure of 
public funding is taking place on research that is 
consistent with citizens’ and individuals’ expectations. 
The European Commission should develop an 
institutionalised strategy to benefit more from the 
work carried out by independent networks of 
academics  ex ante (in the phase preceding the 
presentation of policy or legislative proposals) and ex 
post (monitoring the transposition and effects of EU 
law and in the evaluation of structural conditions of 
national legal, administrative and judicial systems – 
rule of law and good administration). 
2.  The Stockholm Programme needs to be based 
on  a more democratic and participatory policy 
process in comparison to previous experiences under 
the Tampere and the Hague Programmes. The 
Stockholm process should not only incorporate the 
‘knowledge’ acquired by networks of academics, but 
also the views and practical experiences of civil 
society, social partners and local and regional 
actors/networks in the framing and definition of the 
policies that will guide the AFSJ in the years to come. 
Identifying new European venues and developing 
existing ones, for channelling the experiences, 
‘knowledge’ and monitoring role of these actors and 
practitioners to the construction of the EU’s AFSJ 
might actually constitute one of the key conditions to 
ensure the latter’s legitimacy and coherency in short 
and long-term perspectives. 
3.  The personal scope of the AFSJ cannot be 
limited to those labelled as ‘citizens’ if European 
integration does not want to be in tension with a 
Europe of diversity, non-discrimination and 
fundamental rights of non-citizens and residents. 
The added value of the EU is to play a role of 
facilitator and a promoter of the protection of the 
liberty and security of the individual in an enlarged 
common European space. ‘Strengthening Freedom 
and Solidarity’ of the individual (rather than 
exclusively those of ‘the citizen’) should therefore 
constitute the starting guiding principle to be 
adopted by the Stockholm Programme. Further, the 
rights and protection of those third country nationals 
not falling within the narrow category of ‘legally 
resident’, and under irregular status of stay inside the 
Union – undocumented migrants – should also be at 
the heart of the EU’s attention and social protection 
strategies, particularly when taking into consideration 
their high degree of vulnerability and insecurity. 
4. A Europe of fundamental human rights needs to 
be implicated with a common immigration policy 
driven by a ‘rights-based approach’. The 
Stockholm Programme and the Commission should 
place at the heart of its priorities the creation of an 
exhaustive and consolidated framework of protection 
that is respectful of the fundamental human rights of 
third country nationals. The normative patchwork of Towards the Next Phase of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice | 11 
rights and administrative procedures currently 
provided for TCNs under EU immigration law is too 
diversified, weak and incoherent, which is further 
substantiated by the silence over the fate of 
undocumented migrants. More effective mechanisms 
need to be envisaged in order to ensure the correct 
application and accessibility of existing EU rights and 
freedoms of third-country nationals. A rights-based 
approach ensuring the principle of fair and equal 
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